Abstract-The reliance on the loss-of-signal (LOS) of upstream transmissions to indicate fiber/component failure is potentially unsuitable in networks that implement sleep/doze mode operation. In such networks, the transition into sleep/doze mode would result in no signal transmission, and when used in conjunction with conventional LOS to indicate network failure, would result in erroneous triggering of false alarm and subsequently protection switching. Recently, converged access networks using a hybrid passive optical architecture, have been favored as a low-cost and high-bandwidth solution to deliver high-bandwidth applications to both fixed access and mobile users. These networks are referred to as Hybrid PON Converged Access Networks. Protection against fiber/equipment failures in these networks is critical considering the customer base, network span, and traffic supported. This paper proposes four survivable architectures for such converged access networks. These architectures combine rapid fault detection and protection switching against high impact failures but without the need to rely on upstream transmissions for LOS detection. A comparison of the four architectures across three different area densities under three deployment scenarios, is presented. Guidance for selecting the best protection architecture to be deployed, considering area densities and deployment scenarios, is provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Converged access networks have been considered as a costeffective solution to serve fixed access and mobile xhaul, e.g., backhaul and fronthaul, users [1] . The hybrid passive optical network topology, which combines Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) and Time Division Multiplexing (TDM), supports a wide customer base with increased network span and high bandwidth applications. Such networks are known as Hybrid PON Converged Access Networks (HPCANs). Other advantages of HPCANs include the potential to reuse the existing Optical Distribution Network (ODN), thus ensuring smooth migration from legacy TDM-PONs, and allowing multirate transmission combining dedicated high bandwidth wavelength channels with shared TDM wavelength channels.
The survivability of HPCANs cannot be overlooked due to the high impact of failures. Thus, providing resilience against component/fiber failure through fault detection and protection switching is an important consideration in the network's design. In [2] , four protection schemes applied to HPCANs were compared. These architectures considered the use of loss of signal (LOS) at the main central office (MCO) to indicate fiber/component failure and subsequently to activate network protection switching. Nonetheless, using LOS may potentially be unsuitable in networks that implement sleep/doze mode operation. As the access segment was shown to be the dominant contributor to the overall power consumption of optical networks [3] , power-saving operations were introduced in access networks to reduce the power consumption of optical networks units (ONUs) [4] . During idle periods, sleep/doze capable ONU transmitters will transition into sleep/doze mode in which no upstream data will be transmitted. If LOS is used to detect faults, erroneous triggering of false alarms and subsequently protection switching will occur during sleep/doze periods. Therefore, in such cases, the absence of upstream signals at the MCO cannot be considered as a true indication of LOS.
In this work, four new survivable architectures for HPCANs are proposed to address the reliability requirements of future energy-efficient networks.
The proposed architectures can be implemented with sleep/doze mode transmitters at the macro base stations (MBSs) and optical network units (ONUs), and do not need to rely on upstream transmissions of these transmitters to indicate LOS. Instead a CW monitoring light for such a purpose is implemented. Each of the proposed architectures exploits highly-sensitive monitoring modules with fast-response fault detection and subsequent protection switching times [5] . The motivation behind the design of the reflective protection architectures is covered in Section II. In Section III, the principle of operation of the monitoring module and the four protection architectures, are described. In Section IV, details of network planning for three different cities/towns, namely Berlin, Helfenberg, and Miesbach, representing dense urban, urban, and rural densities respectively, are presented. Results from comparison of the protection architectures and unprotected architecture in terms of connection availability, failure impact factor, yearly energy consumption and total network cost, are presented in Section V. Here, our analysis is carried out to compare four survivable architectures serving three different population densities (urban, urban, and rural) in three different deployment scenarios (brownfield, duct reuse, and greenfield). A brief summary of the paper, including guidance on the selection of the best survivable architecture to be deployed, considering area densities and deployment scenarios, is provided in Section VI.
II. MOTIVATION
In conventional networks, a LOS defect is used to trigger protection switching. A LOS defect is detected when the incoming signal has no transitions, i.e., when the signal level is lower than or equal to a signal level of 30 dB below nominal, over a period of 175 ± 75 contiguous pulse intervals [6] . For a 10 Gbps line-rate, this interval equates to 170±75 ns. As an illustrative example, we consider an access network with 32 ONUs where upstream access is based on TDMA. Each ONU transmits once per polling cycle which we arbitrarily choose to be 5 ms in this example. Fig. 1(a) shows the normalized upstream load of the access network vs time of day (TOD). A network load of 1 represents 10 Gb/s upstream traffic aggregated from 32 ONUs. From Fig. 1(a) , there are two peak periods, one around noon time and the other around 1800 hour. From this figure, we first evaluate the average time interval per polling cycle that an ONU transmits upstream to the MCO, i.e. blue line in Fig. 1(b) . Then, considering upstream transmissions from all 32 ONUs, we evaluate the average time interval whereby there are no upstream transmissions from all ONUs to the CO, i.e., the red line in Fig. 1(b) . As can be observed, the non-transmission interval is higher than 250 ns, i.e. solid green line, for most of the day. Typically, transceivers output a CW light with power level higher than that required to detect LOS defect when no transmission is required, but in energy-efficient networks where transceivers are capable of dozing and sleeping, the transmitters will be powered down with no power output. From Fig. 1(b) , LOS defect will be detected for most of the day. To alleviate this problem, the MCO can factor in the non-transmission intervals with respect to TOD to prevent triggering LOS. Nonetheless, this solution is inflexible to network and traffic changes, unsuitable when dynamic bandwidth allocation schemes with varying nontransmission periods are implemented, and will potentially yield longer failure response times. The reflective architectures proposed in this work overcome these limitations and provide a more flexible solution to detecting network failures.
III. SURVIVABLE ARCHITECTURES

A. Principle of Operation of Reflective Architecttures
The protection architectures proposed in this work exploit the use of a monitoring module at each OLT to transmit and receive reflected monitoring signal, e.g. on channel λ M . The principle of operation in using the monitoring module to trigger protection switching rather than relying on upstream LOS is based on the added advantage of a loopback feature located either at the remote node or at the input of each MBS [7] . All architectures retain the passive ODN nature of legacy networks in that if any active component is added to the unprotected architecture to achieve survivability, it is confined only to within the MBS and the Main Central Office (MCO) which houses multiple OLTs, each serving a different converged access network. Further, the monitoring wavelength channel is spaced an integer multiple of the arrayed waveguide grating's (AWG's) free spectral range away from the MBS's downstream and upstream wavelengths, allowing λ M to be detected at and reflected from the MBS.
Each monitoring module comprises an optical coupler, a Mon TX to transmit CW monitoring light on channel λ M , and a Mon RX to detect λ M . Since only the presence or absence of λ M is required to detect working path failure and subsequently trigger protection switching, the bandwidth of Mon RX can be low. The previous experimental characterization of our purposefully built 100 kHz bandwidth Mon RX shows a high receiver sensitivity of -51 dBm [5] . Such high sensitivity allows the Mon RX to be reliably applied in topologies with high propagation losses due to either extended reach and/or wide customer base.
The monitoring channel can be modulated with a pilot tone for increased receiver sensitivity. The fast response time of the Mon RX can be observed from oscilloscope traces shown in Fig. 2 . It takes the Mon RX around ~ 524 ns to detect of the falling edge of λ M , indicating the absence of λ M and hence working path failure [5] . Fig. 3 illustrates the schematic diagram of the first protection architecture, the reflective disjoint fiber protection (R-DFP) HPCAN. Typically, the OLT includes one or several PON Line Terminals (LTs) and some other components (e.g., optical switch for protection). In this work, we consider twostage HPCANs. The first stage exploits the use of an athermal AWG in Remote Node 1 (RN1) to implement WDM for bandwidth-dedicated business customers and mobile customers through an MBS. A further second stage comprises a power splitter in Remote Node 2 (RN2) to implement TDM between bandwidth-sharing residential users. The fiber link between the MCO and RN1, RN1 and RN2, and RN2 and the residential users, are referred to as the Feeder Fiber (FF), the Distribution Fiber (DF) and the Last Mile Fiber (LMF), respectively. In this work, we focus on the protection against the high-impact failures of FF and MBS. Each MBS in the considered HPCAN has a co-located ONU, and is directly connected to RN1 by dedicated downstream and upstream wavelength channels. It can be seen that the delivery of broadband services to mobile x-hauling, business and residential users can co-exist within the same HPCAN.
B. Reflective Disjoint Fiber Protection (R-DFP)
The R-DFP solution, as depicted in Fig. 3 , utilizes disjoint FF and DF to each MBS for protection. As compared to an unprotected HPCAN, it necessitates an additional optical switch (OSW1), two WDM filters, and one monitoring module at each OLT, two 1×3 couples, and one 2×N AWGs at each RN1, and two 2 WDM filters, one optical switch (OSW2), one Monitor RX, at each MBS. Under normal working conditions, λ M is reflected at the AWG and detected at the monitoring module at the OLT. In the event of a working path failure, λ M is absent at the OLT. This then triggers the OSW1 into CROSS state, and the reassignment of the downstream and monitoring wavelengths. Also, the absence of λ M at the MBS triggers OSW2 into CROSS state and the traffic is sent through the protection DF.
C. Reflective Ring Feeder Fiber Protection (R-RFFP)
In this survivable architecture, the MBSs are protected through the interconnection of all RN1s in a ring topology. The solution necessitates the same additional components as those discussed in Section II.B but with longer FF and DF link lengths. Each RN1 is connected to two FF paths, one clockwise and the other counter-clockwise, which in turn provides the connection with the MCO. The shorter FF path is designated as the working path whereas the longer one as the protection path. Therefore, similarly to the R-DFP scheme, a disjoint DF is implemented between the RN1 and MBS. to the closest disjoint RN1. This protection solution necessitates duplication of the partial reflector, WDM coupler, and RX monitor at each MBS. The absence of reflected λ M at OLT1 indicates the working path failure, thereby resulting in the MCO to send downlink data and monitoring signal towards the MBS using new preassigned wavelengths from OLT2. At the same time, the absence of λ M at the MBS triggers OSW2 into CROSS state, and the MBS sends uplink data on a new pre-assigned wavelength.
D. Reflective Disjoint MBS DF Protection (R-DMBSP)
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E. Reflective Microwave MBS Protection (R-μWP)
The R-μWP survivable scheme is illustrated in Fig. 5 where a microwave link is implemented between two disjoint MBSs to provide full protection to each of the MBSs. In this scheme, it is important that both MBSs are disjointly connected to the MCO and a clear line of sight exists between the two. This protection solution necessitates a monitoring module at the OLT, and a combination of partial reflector, WDM coupler, and RX monitor at each MBS. The partial reflector mirror at each MBS reflects partial λ M back to the MCO and forwards the remaining λ M towards the WDM filter. In the event of a failure on the working path of MBS1, the reflected λ M at OLT1 and upstream λ M at MBS1 are absent. In this instance, the MCO sends downlink data using OLT2, while MBS1 sends uplink data to MBS2 via the microwave link.
IV. HYBRID PON CONVERGED ACCESS NETWORK DIMENSIONING
A. Network Dimensioning
The dimensioning of converged access networks aims at interconnecting any building and MBS of an area while minimizing the required equipment and infrastructure. For that purpose, the methodology introduced in [2] and [8] is applied as follows:
• First the area is selected from Open Street Map (www.openstreetmap.org). The data of the selected area can be downloaded, filtered, and parsed as shown in Fig. 6 for the Berlin area. • The MBS locations in the area are included in the data. In case where no real MBS locations are available, a grid with an inter-MBS distance can be considered, as in our case. However, the MBS are reallocated to the closest street (realistic assumption provided by operator)
• Clustering is required in order to associate buildings to the power splitters at RN2 (shown in Fig. 7 ), and to associate RN2 and MBSs to the AWGs at RN1. The cluster size is limited by the splitting ratio and the port usage defined by the operator. The location of the RN is assumed to be the closest intersection point of the centroid of each cluster.
• Once the locations of the RNs are known, the fiber layout is computed according to the needs of each protection scheme. For example, the FF layout of R-DFP (Section II.B) is different from the FF layout of Fig. 7 Clustering of buildings into power splitters (RN2). The centroid of each cluster, i.e. the best location of each RN2 is reallocated to the closest intersection node (depicted as triangle). R-RFFP (Section II.C) as shown in Fig. 8 . R-DFP shows the working FF in blue and the shortest disjoint FF for protection in red. On the other hand, the R-RFFP is computer using the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) [9] . Here the FF layout is a ring so that all RN2 of the working FF take the shortest path to the CO and the protection FF is the opposite direction.
• Based on this methodology, the total fiber and duct required for each segment (FF, DF and LMF) is calculated as along with the size of the cable needed at each street. For example the total fiber layout for the rural area (as it can be more clearly distinguished) is shown in Fig. 9 .
B. Infrastucture Used for Evaluation
We use the unprotected architecture as a benchmark and compare it with the proposed the protection architectures under three different area densities and under three deployment scenarios. Table I summarizes the characteristics of the three considered cities/towns, namely Berlin, Helfenberg, and Miesbach, representing dense urban, urban, and rural densities, respectively. Further, the normalized cost of fiber/km in brownfield and duct reuse scenarios is 4 CU/km and 300 CU/km [10] where 1 CU represents the cost of a GPON ONU cost. For the greenfield scenario, the normalized cost of fiber/km is dependent on the deployment area: namely 1000 CU in dense urban area, 700 CU in urban area, and 400 CU in rural area, respectively [10] . The brownfield scenario assumes the use of already installed dark fibers; duct reuse scenario assumes fiber costs that include blowing fiber into already installed ducts; and the greenfield scenario assumes fiber costs that includes trenching, laying, and blowing of fiber into new ducts. Further, for this study, we consider 40 wavelength channel athermal AWGs and 1:32 power splitters. The port utilization is set to 80%. The remaining 20% of the ports are left for protection or future use.
V. ANALYSIS OF PROTECTION ARCHITECTURES
In this section, the protection architectures are compared to the unprotected architecture (UA) using the following evaluation parameters: connection availability, failure impact factor, network cost and yearly energy consumption. The availability, cost, and power values of components used in our calculations are summarized in Table II .
A. Network Availability
Using the availability of the different components listed in Table II , the connection availability of MBS for all architectures are computed and compared in Fig. 10 . Connection availability is defined as the probability of a connection being operational at any point of time. The availability of connection between MBS and MCO, A MBS , is calculated using:
where p i denotes the unavailability of unprotected component i and p j 2 denotes the unavailability of protected component j. In turn p i and p j are estimated based on their failure characteristics, in particular the mean time to failure (MTTF) and mean time to repair (MTTR). These parameters can be derived from the historical failure statistics of the components. In Eqn. (1), both component i and j, constitutes the connection between the MCO and MBS. Results in Fig. 9 show that all protection architectures have connection availability of at least four nines (i.e., at least 99.99%), which is higher than the unprotected architecture. Results also highlight that although R-DFP and R-RFFP have different fiber lengths, they have comparable connection availability, eluding to the fact that once a fiber is protected, fiber length has minor impact on the connection availability. This does not apply to the architecture that is unprotected which connection availability is strongly dependent on the fiber length. Further, results show that R-DMBSP and R-μWP which OLTs are protected have higher connection availability than the others, thereby highlighting the significance of protecting the OLT. The R-μWP protection architecture offers the highest connection availability due to complete network protection.
B. Failure Impact Factor
Failure Impact Factor (FIF) is a measure of the impact that a failure in the network has on its users. To calculate the FIF for a network connection, the FIF of each unprotected equipment and fiber in the connection is summed. In turn, the FIF of an unprotected equipment/fiber is computed by multiplying its unavailability with its Failure Penetration Range (FPR), defined as the number of affected users/connections when this component fails [11] . Table III compares the FIF of all protection architectures with the unprotected architecture. All protection architectures have lower FIF than the unprotected. The R-DMBSP architecture has a significantly lower FIF than R-DFP and R-RFFP due to protection of the OLT at the MCO, again highlighting the importance of protecting the OLT. R-μWP has zero FIF due to the fact that it is fully protected.
C. Network Energy Consumption
The use of redundant fiber/equipment and microwave links to implement protection comes at the expense of increased total network cost and network power consumption. Using power consumption values summarized in Table II , the total yearly network energy (kWh) consumed by the different protection architectures is computed and compared to the unprotected architecture in Fig. 11 . The total network power includes the corresponding components and equipment in the working and protection paths of a network. Unsurprisingly, the results highlight that the protection architectures consume more power than that of the unprotected architecture though the incremental yearly energy consumption only ranges from 2.9% to 8.5%. Results also highlight that for all considered architectures, the deployment in the rural scenario consumes the least power due to lower numbers of OLTs and MBSs supported. With respect to incremental yearly energy consumption (kWh) over the unprotected architecture, R-μWP incurs the highest at 7.7% and 8.5% for dense urban and urban areas, respectively. This is attributed to the power consumption of the microwave link. As for the rural area, both R-DFP and R-RFFP incur the highest incremental yearly energy consumption over the unprotected architecture at 5.7%. Table II . Unsurprisingly, protection architecture costs are higher than the unprotected. Also, for each architecture and area density considered, rural deployment is characterized by the highest cost due to long fiber lengths.
D. Network Cost
Considering only the brownfield scenario, the cost of R-μWP incurs the highest cost regardless of the population density. This is attributed to the fact that the R-μWP architecture requires the implementation of one microwave link per pair of MBSs for protection. The aggregated cost of all microwave links, each at 150 CU, therefore dominates. The R-RFFP has the second highest deployment costs in the brownfield scenario due to the long fiber lengths used in the working and protection paths of this ring architecture. The greenfield scenario has the highest cost across all architectures and all population densities, mainly attributed to fiber costs. Out of all protection architectures, the R-RFFP incurs the highest cost due to the fact that the required aggregate fiber length of the working and protection paths is the longest as compared to all other architectures for all area densities. The R-μWP architecture incurs the lowest cost amongst all protection architectures since this architecture does not rely on protection fiber to achieve full protection. In a greenfield deployment, the aggregate cost of microwave links is not as significant as that of the fiber. The same trends and explanations can be applied to the results computed for the duct reuse case, whereby the cost of fiber/km (includes fiber blowing into existing ducts) is 300 CU as compared to 4 CU in the brownfield case. 
VI. SUMMARY
This paper proposes four reflective protection architectures to protect against feeder fiber and macro base station failures in future Hybrid PON Converged Access Networks (HPCAN). The architectures do not need to rely on loss-of-signal in the upstream direction to trigger protection switching. To compare the four survivable architectures, we have carried out detailed evaluations of connection availability, failure-impactfactor, network yearly energy consumption, and network cost. Results from this study provide guidance for the choice of the best protection architecture to serve each of the three considered area densities (urban, urban, and rural) under each of the three deployment scenarios (brownfield, duct reuse, and greenfield). The R-μWP architecture offers the best solution in duct reuse and greenfield deployments. Though incurring an incremental yearly energy consumption of up to 8% as compared to the unprotected HPCAN, the R-µWP delivers high connection availability with zero failure impact factor at the lowest total network cost for all area densities considered. For the brownfield scenario, R-DMBSP offers the best solution, providing high connection availability, low FIF, whilst incurring the lowest total network cost and incremental yearly energy consumption irrespective of area density.
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